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**AMENDED BLD-048      NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-4067 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  CHRISTIAN DIOR WOMACK, 
      Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(Related to E.D. Pa. Crim. No. 2:13-cr-00206-001) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
November 17, 2016 
 
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR., and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  February 3, 2017) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Christian Dior Womack, a.k.a. Gucci Prada, pleaded guilty to charges of sex 
trafficking of a minor and sex trafficking by force.  We affirmed his judgment of 
sentence.  United States v. Womack, 646 F. App’x 258, 259 (3d Cir. 2016).  Also, we 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
have denied several mandamus petitions that he has filed.  See, e.g., In re Womack, 639 
F. App’x 70 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam). 
   Relatively recently, in the District Court, Womack filed a motion for review, 
under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), of the United States Attorney’s 
purported failure to investigate claims of intimidation of a defense witness by a family 
member of a prosecution witness during the lead up to his trial date.  Womack now 
presents another petition for a writ of mandamus.  He argues that the District Judge will 
not be able to fairly adjudicate his APA motion.  In support, he cites actions that the 
District Judge took when presented with pre-trial allegations of witness intimidation.  He 
discusses an ex parte conversation with the prosecutor, decisions about the investigation 
into witness intimidation, and a ruling “to accommodate the government’s anxiousness to 
start trial.” Womack seeks an order requiring the District Judge to recuse and vacating 
“any and all orders” that we deem “tainted” by the District Judge’s partiality.   
 We will deny the petition as amended.1  Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy.  
See Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976).  A petitioner must ordinarily 
have no other means to obtain the desired relief, and he must show a clear and 
indisputable right to issuance of the writ.  In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 772 
(3d Cir. 1992).   
                                              
1 Womack’s motion to amend his mandamus petition is granted. 
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 Womack does not show that he is entitled to an order requiring the District Judge’s 
recusal.  A mandamus petition can be a proper means of challenging a district judge’s 
refusal to recuse pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455.  In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 
300-01 (3d Cir. 2004).  Womack’s petition implicates two related subsections of § 455:  
subsection (a) requires recusal when a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned, and subsection (b) requires recusal when the judge has a personal bias or 
prejudice concerning a party.  However, neither serves as a basis for recusal here.2 
 Womack’s complaints are largely based on ordinary judicial decision making.  
Mere dissatisfaction with rulings does not warrant recusal.  See Securacomm Consulting, 
Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000) (“We have repeatedly stated 
that a party’s displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for 
recusal.”).  He also describes an ex parte communication.  Although ex parte 
communications are strongly disfavored, see In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d at 309-
10, the communication does not require recusal here.  There is no indication that 
substantive advice was either solicited or offered during the discussion that Womack 
describes.  See In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d at 789 (stating that ex parte contacts 
are “tolerated of necessity . . . where related to non-merits issues [and] for administrative 
matters . . .”); cf. In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d at 305 (“We do not hold that ex 
                                              
2 Additionally, we could rule that mandamus relief is not available because he has 
another means to seek the desired relief; he could file a recusal motion in the District 
Court.  Cf. In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 224 (3d Cir. 2003).  However, 
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parte communications alone – in the absence of any conflict of interest – require 
recusal.”).  Additionally, we discern no evidence of bias in the record.   
 Furthermore, to the extent that Womack again seeks to challenge the criminal 
judgment against him or earlier rulings in his criminal case, mandamus is not a substitute 
for appeal.  See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004); Madden v. 
Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996).   
 For these reasons, we will deny the petition for mandamus as amended.  In light of 
our disposition, Womack’s petition to compel an answer from the respondents is denied.  
See Fed. R. App. P. 21(b) (“The court may deny the petition without an answer.”)     
                                                                                                                                                  
because Womack has sought and failed to obtain the District Judge’s recusal previously, 
we consider the merits of his petition.  
